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Abstract
As the price is always a prime factor taken into 
consideration when a 3PL provides logistics service. With 
increasingly cases of logistics service providing to retailers 
rather than manufacturers nowadays, quantity may be not 
as an important factor. For retailers always have certain 
amounts of goods, they can hardly expand the scale at their 
will to obtain a quantity discount. To logistics companies, 
most of them are medium-sized and small enterprises, 
under limitations of its fields and capability. They can 
neither provide enough warehousing area for retailers. This 
paper builds the price decision model in expectation of 
utility obtaining by service contract instead of the whole 
revenueof pricemultiplying quantity, and would be more 
suitable for 3PL to apply when working for a retailer. 
Besides, this paper sets the opponent’s acceptable price as 
uncertain information, which is more realistic than the usual 
complete and perfect information assumption. Based on 
the incomplete information game and introducing variables 
of service capability and service level, this paper will give 
the best decision of pricing order and a specific amount in 
quotingthe price stage. Further discussion will quantify the 
benefits of pricing first and factors affect the benefits which 
aremore conducive to the third -party logisticsenterprises to 
provide services for external companies.
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INTRODUCTION
It is never too much to have discussions about how to 
make a better quoting price decision it is a key point when 
two parties of supply chain consider collaborating. As we 
know, price is always the most pivotal factor no matter a 
manufacturer or a retailer finds logistics company. When 
our group did field research in Jingliang City Logistics 
Department for the Undergraduates Innovative Project, 
a manager of this company’s client told us that he would 
choose logistics company with the feasible quoting price 
in a certain level of service, and he always has a range 
of acceptable price in advance. Jingliang City Logistics 
Department mainly provides warehousing service for 
retailers, such as Yansha Outlets, Dazhong Household 
Appliances and some other retailers. Before getting a long-
term contract, both parties would make deal in price (about 
1-2 RMB per square meter). In this way, how to make 
the most beneficial price with a certain degree of service 
level is worth a discussion: whether quoting price first 
would get a benefit and what is the specific price should 
be quoted. The factor of quantity may be not as crucial 
to a retailer as to a manufacture, so we will not take the 
traditional utility function of price multiplies quantity. 
Instead, based on the dynamic game of incomplete 
information, the final decision will be evaluated by the 
expectation of contract’s agreement utility in this paper. A 
strategy of pricing order and specific quoting price will be 
given. Beyond that, we will have a further discussion of 
factors that influence the benefits of quoting price and the 
compensation of cost when you have to pay in order to get 
the initiative.
1.  REVIEW OF LITERATURES
There is never short of researches about pricing strategies. 
However, from the classic Bertrand Model, decision about 
price always takes quantity as an indispensable factor into 
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consideration. Literatures concerning third-party logistics 
service pricing is not scarce, however, most of them focus 
on qualitative analysis instead of quantitative analysis. As 
Xie and Li (2010) published several research in methods 
and factors should be considered or applied in the pricing 
decision. These provide useful information to build up 
specific quantitative model. Instead specific quoting 
price decision, existed literatures prefer to investigate the 
benefit of cooperation or competition in bidding process 
and the times of quoting’s benefits, like several articles of 
TianDagangand XueHao. In BaiYanhuaand YanhuaYing’s 
research, the model based on complete information static 
game gives basic analysis between cost and revenue. 
Although they apply the game theory to the pricing 
mechanism of the third partylogistics enterprises in 
standard logistics service and core logistics services, the 
cost is not described in a detailed expression and decisions 
of 3PL and client are made at the same time which is not 
realistic. 
As many consider the situation of a manufacture and 
a logistics server who provide service always in terms of 
transport, packaging and warehousing, quantity does take 
as an important role. The manufacture’s production will 
be affected by the price of its total cost which includes 
the expense of logistics operation. Nowadays, the form of 
providing warehouse for retailer is more common for 3PL 
especially the city logistics server with medium or small 
scale.This model’s assumption and standard of evaluation 
will fit for logistics service provided to retailers much 
more.
2.  THE MODELING FRAMEWORK
According to background mentioned in Chapter 1, this 
paper would consider the simple but effective service 
model that consists of one retailer and one third-party 
logistics server. When talks about the comprehensive 
capacity of these two decision maker, no one is so 
powerful that has ability to take a leading position in 
the whole decision process. In this way, the decision 
model of these two participants could be considered to 
have the same reaction function. Basic assumptions are 
that both parties are entirely rational and pursue profit 
maximization. As we do not take quantity variable into 
consideration, the traditional profit presentation of u=p*q 
(price multiplies quantity) will not be available. In this 
paper, the final profits of both retailerand third-party 
logistics server would be present as the expectation of 
dealing contracts, which are denoted asuland ur.
Focusing on the price order of two participants, we 
will discuss the two different order cases respectively.
Let eland er denote the cost of logistics service 
provided for the third-party logistics server and retailer, 
respectively. To better describe the cost of logistics 
service, we would invite specific variables of logistics 
service level denoted as l, and conversion coefficient 
denoted as k to indicate the coste=k*l2. The coefficient is 
service level’s conversion to service cost, which reflects 
the ability of providing logistics service. Of course, eland 
er would be respectively expressed as el =kl*l
2 and er 
=kr*l
2. To third-party logistics server, el just shows the 
cost of service it provides; however, erwould be conceived 
as the cost of logistics operation if the retailer deals with 
by its own ability. We also assume that kl  is always smaller 
thankr. This would provide motivations for the retailer to 
find a third-party logistics server.
In two cases of different participants fixing price 
first, pl and pr represents bidding price of the third-party 
logistics server and the retailer respectively. As we are 
particular interested in warehousing service providing, 
we would point each price as the storage unit(per square 
meter) price. In this way, if contract is signed in each 
participant own bidding process, the benefit per unit of 
their process would be indicated as pl - el and pr -er. Let 
sl and sr denote the benefits obtained by the third-party 
logistics server and the retailer if an agreement is not 
reached. Now, we only need the probability of contract 
agreement to work out the final benefit expectation. Let 
αdenote the probability of contract agreement with the 
third-party logistics server bidding process, and β denote 
the retailer’s one.
Here, we have finished the expression of final benefit 
expectations to both parties:
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For this model, we set conditions based on incomplete 
information. To be specific, both parties cannot get the 
exact information of the opposite’s acceptable price. The 
only thing there now is just the range of possible price 
to each of the parties. And we set v—land v—l to indicate the 
highest and lowest price thoseare acceptable to the third-
party logistics server known by the retailer; v—r and v—r mean 
the same to the logistics server.Further, we assume that 
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Xl and Xr are the random variable, which has CDF 
(cumulative distribution function)F.
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Where,δis the cumulative probability; uniformly 
distributed,strictly monotone increasing and derivable in 
interval [v—,v
 —]. In this way, wehave F( v—|δ)=0, F( v 
— | δ)=1. 
These assumptions are common knowledge to both parties.
3.  QUOTING PRICE DECISION
The key point we care about is whether fixing price first 
would bring abundant benefits and if it is true, what exact 
price should be fixed to obtain the highest benefits. So, 
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we just consider situations that the deal will be made. As 
we have assumed in Chapter 2 that kl is always smaller 
than kr; it is also meaningful to get a contract signed: el is 
always smaller than er in the same logistics service level. 
And this is the basic condition of price decision.
3.1  Third-Party Logistics’ Quoting First
Assuming the only thing both parties care about is the 
price offered by the other, the probability of reaching 
agreement or not will be influenced by it. So, when the 
logistics server fix price first, the probability of dealing 
with the retailer is
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2. (2)
It makes sense that when the price is much profitable 
for the other, he will be more willing to accept. Bringαto 
Equation(1), we have the logistics server price decision 
function:
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At present, we do not take the cost of pricing first 
into consideration, which may include the expenses of 
information collection, marketing survey, data analyzing, 
etc. However, in Chapter5, we will further discuss the 
max cost the party who price first could afford.
For better analyze final solution of the function, we 
firstly assume the value of not obtaining contract is 
nothing, expressed as sl=0.And the meaningful price given 
by logistics server  has limitations:  [ ]max( , ),l r l rp v e v∈
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giving price will not be higher than estimated retailer’s 
highest price. And as logistics server should find the most 
beneficial price, on the condition of getting profits (pl > 
el), he will not give a price lower than estimated retailer’s 
lowest price. We should find the best response of pl to this 
function to make the most benefits, that is 
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Firstly, we would calculate its second derivative of pl to 
find whether there is a value to realize the maximization 
of utility. And we get 
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that the function is concave with maximum. Than we figure 
out the first derivative of pl as the optimal solution as:
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To simplify the expression, we denote Δ1= v
—
r -  v— r. 
Bringing Pl
* back to function, we would get the final max 
utility expressed as:
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To retailer, his utility in 3PL quoting first stage would 
be measured as his expense of finishing logistics operation 
himself minus the quoting price of 3PL. So the expression 
of retailer’s utility when he accepts 3PL’s quoting price is
  
 2* 2( )=
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And if retailer deny this price, neither party would get 
a utility, expressedasul=ur=0. However, as we have set the 
condition that
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whether the best response of 3PL’s quoting price meets 
this requirement.For assumption that el is always smaller 
than erhas been made, that el is always lower than v
—
r is 
established either. *
lP would always satisfies the condition 
that 
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quoting price would not change. Both utilities of 3PL and 
retailer would be emained as expressions above.
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And if retailer accepts this quoting price, his utility 
would be:
    
 2* 2( )=
2
r l
r l r
v k lu P k l +−
 [ ]max( , ),l r l rp v e v∈
 *l l re P v≤ ≤
 *l rP v≥
 *l rP v<
 ' 2l r lu v k l= −
 ' 2r r ru k l v= − . (9)
If not, both parties would not get utility at all.
So far, we get the integrate expressions of two parties 
utilities when 3PL quoting a price first. That is also our 
proposition1:
When 3PL pricing first and retailer accept the price:
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3.2  Retailer’s Quoting First
Giving the same restrictive conditions as the third-
party logistics server’s that price influence the decision 
probability, when retailer quoting a price first the 
probability of dealing can be expressed as:
4Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
The Price Decision of Order With Third-Party 
Logistics Based on Incomplete Information Game
    
 = r l
l l
p v
v v
β
−
−
 2( )= ( )+ sr l l rr r r r r
l l l l
p v v pu p k l p
v v v v
− −
−
− −
 [ ],min( , )r l l rp v v e∈
 
[ ]
*
* 2 *( )=max ( )| ,min( , )r lr r r r r l l r
l l
p vu P k l p p v v e
v v
 −
− ∈ 
− 
 2
*
2
l r
r
v k lP +=
. (10)
It makes sense that 3PL prefer higher service price 
with the same service level, so the higher t price afforded 
by retailer, the more possibility 3PL would contract. And 
bring β to function 1, we have the retailer’s price decision 
function
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Also same as 3PL, we assume the value of not 
obtaining contract is nothing, ex ressed as sr=0. The 
meaningful price given by logistics server also has 
limitations: 
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. The retailer’s giving 
price will not lower than estimated 3PL’s lowest price, 
otherwise 3PL will definitely not accept. And as retailer 
should find the most beneficial price, on the condition of 
getting profits (pl < pr), he will not give a price lower than 
estimated 3PL’s highest price. We should find the best 
response of pr to this function to make the most benefits. 
In this way, we can equally get the retailer’s deciding 
function,
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When retailer quotes a price first, the best response of 
price and corresponding utility would be figured out in 
exactly the same way as 3PL’s function. Equally, we get 
retailer’s best quoting price as
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Under this condition, the utility of 3PL would be 
considered as retailer’s quoting price minus logistics 
company service cost, if 3PL accepts this price. The utility 
expression would be 
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Also too simplify the expression, we denote Δ2= v
—
l -  v—l. 
And bringing Pr
* back to retailer’s utility function, we get 
retailer’s max utility expressed as
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The best response of retailer’s quoting price should 
also be examined to see whether satisfy the restrictive 
limitations that 
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previous assumptions, we can easily get the conclusion 
that 
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 is constant satisfied. And only should 
we discuss different situations of relationships between 
Pr
*and v—l .
① If it is true that  *r lP v≤
 *r lP v>
, best response of retailer’s 
quoting price would not change. Both utilities of 3PL and 
retailer would be remained as expressions above.
② If 
 *r lP v≤
 *r lP v> , retailer is not necessary to give the 
higher price, and v—l  would be set as his quoting price. If 
3PLaccepts this price, his utility would be expressed as:
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And retailer’s utility would be
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No matter in which situation, no utility would both 
parties get if 3PL refuse retailer’s quoting price.
Here, we get our proposition2:
When rerailer pricing first and 3PL accept the price:
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4.  RESULT ANALYSIS
In chapter 3, we have figured out the specific price and 
utility of both parties in different pricing order. The 3PL 
would provide the most profitable quoting price if he 
has chance to quote first. And he can also work out the 
utility when the opposite price first through this model. 
However, the purpose of this paper is to compare the 
different situations utility, which could help 3PL to 
decide whether or not should he strive for quoting 
first. And we would also like to get the benefits or 
loss of quoting order. Further, to see which the factors 
would influence the benefits (or loss) and how can we 
make use of these information is also meaningful and 
important.
For there are different situations with best response 
of price and corresponding utility, it is hard to get a clear 
conclusion under all these cases. So we would set a few 
more limits to simplify the final result in the two different 
order ways.
We’d like to let both situations quoting price meets 
the restrictions, in this way we would have
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when etailer 
price first.
Let these two inequalities always be met and further 
we have
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We just take the value when both functions get 
equations
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are the two additional restrictions for 
a better discussionofthe results. And these two are not too 
ridiculous to realize. For those just means both parties 
have the same price range and 3PL’s cost would always 
lower than retailer’s.
As we concern more about the benefits (or loss), we 
suppose that both parties would accept the opposite’s 
quoting price as long as it meets the basic restrictions.
As a result, we would have just one result in two pricing 
order:
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When retailer price first, 
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The difference of 3PL’s utility would be 
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However, we can find that this 
lu∆ is always a positive number. The detailed calculative process will 
be present in appendix. And several factors would 
be analyzed in the following part to quantify their 
influence.According to warehousing cost of 3PL we 
know about, we would like to set the range of 3PL’s 
acceptable price range as [0.5, 1.5]. Because the further 
restrictions have limited retailer’s acceptable price has 
the same length of range and always higher than 3PL’s, 
his price range would be [1.5, 2.5]. When we discuss 
the influence of price range, we would set it changing 
from 0.5 to 1. To give a meaningful level of service 
provided, we could figure out that l∈[1, 2], and when 
we do not take it as a variable, it is set as 1.5. The 3PL’s 
service capability is higher than retailer’s, so let kl=0.5, 
kr=0.9. When discuss impact of 3PL’s service capability, 
it would be set from 0 to 0.7, which also satisfies higher 
than retailer’s capability. And to have a better value, 
we would multiply quantity instead of unit profit to 
show the final benefits. Set quantity=5000. Giving these 
parameters above, we can get figures of benefit affected 
by these factors.
 And the red line represents 3PL’s utility when he 
quoting a price first, the blue line represents his utility 
when accepts the opposite’s quoting price.
4.1  ServiceLevel(l)
Figure 1 
Impact of Service Level
From Figure 1, we can easily find that when 3PL 
quoting the price first, he would always get benefits. 
The benefits decrease in service level. This means if 
the logistics service 3PL provides is not high-level, just 
like low requirements warehousing service, much more 
benefits would 3PL get from fixing to price first. In this 
way, 3PL do has motivation to price first.
4.2  Price Range(Δ)
Figure 2
Impact of Price Range
The second figure also testifies the conclusion that 
quoting first always has benefits. Andthe bigger price 
range is, the smaller profits will 3PL get. That means 
the benefits are increasing when 3PL gets more accurate 
range of retailer’s acceptable price.It is easy to understand 
Price accepted utility
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that when one can know the exact cost of the other one, 
he would give the most profitable price to deal a contract. 
However, when making efforts to find the opposite’s 
price range, 3PL would also pay out and this expense 
has not been considered into his cost. But we still get the 
point that 3PL should be motivated to find the opposite’s 
accurate price range.
4.3  ServiceCapability(kl)
Figure 3
Impact of Service Capability
 When taking 3PL’s service capability as a variable, 
the result is a little bit confused to get a clear conclusion. 
Though we can see that quoting price first is still 
profitable, the trend is not as expected. While 3PL would 
not agree on a contract which is deficient, we may just 
ignore the right part when benefit has a minus value. 
Just focus on the positive part, we find the improvement 
in capability does not bring more difference to 3PL’s 
benefits in this model. It can be explained by that no 
other capability related factors have been taken into 
consideration. However, we can still use this formula to 
work out the least service capability of 3PL to guarantee a 
benefit.
5.  MANAGERIAL INSIGHT
According to analyses in Chapter 4, some managerial 
insights have been obtained. First in the process of 
making a price, quoting first would always get benefits. 
Serving for retailer, 3PL should try his best to get the 
first price chance. For example, 3PL could give some 
of benefits he would get from it to obtain this chance. 
Secondly when 3PL provide an easy work, much more 
benefits would he get from quoting first. Though it is hard 
to define a high level service, those logistics operations 
involving fewer techniques could be considered as less 
complicated and a low level service. So in these cases, 
3PL would even sacrifice some profits in price to get 
the quoting chance. Third, 3PL should balance the cost 
and profit of acquiring the opposite’s acceptable price 
range. He should make sure that the increased benefits 
from accurate price rangewould compensate the extra 
cost of getting these informations. And if 3PL itself has 
advantages in attaining information, for example he 
has a great team or many channels, 3PL should exploit 
his advantages to the full as possible. Forth, when we 
take the cost of quoting first into consideration, the 
Δul could be cognized as the compensation. As we 
know
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, we can figure 
out the highest cost of information acquisition. And 
making use of this value, 3PL could decide his devotion 
to retailer’s company messages in advance.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the model based on incomplete information 
game gives the conclusion that in pricing decision 
process, acti e strategy brings benefits which are 
quantified as 
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. And 
3PL should set his price equals to 
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as best response price. Here he would get the utility 
of 
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 which is the maximum value. If 
3PL wants to get a more beneficial position, he would 
try the best to get the chance of fixing the price first. 
Especially when 3PL provides a relatively low level 
service, he would be more motivated to get the chance 
for more benefits. And more accurate information can 
3PL obtain, more profits would he achieve. In this way, 
find a balanced point between expenses and benefits are 
crucial. 3PL also needs to figure out the lowest rank of 
service capability to assure his revenue.
FURTHER DISCUSSION
As the cost of information retrieval has been mentioned 
times in this paper, it is a point worth further discussion. 
Though this model does not take it into consideration, 
later papers could add this variable in to utility function 
to find a new best response price. What’s more, though 
this model sets the cost by expression of service level 
and service capability, these two factors donot be 
taken as variables. We just make sensitive analysis of 
these two,further study could set relevant variables to 
investigate the best response value of them. Of course, 
more relevant factors should be added into the decision 
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formula. And it would turn into a multi-staged dynamic 
game with both price and service level decision. 
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APPENDIX
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always set up, when and only when 
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